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Abstract 
Some recent decisions of the highest court in the European Union (EU) verge on the 
hypocritical: on the one hand, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) criticises the 
United Nations Security Council on the grounds of insufficient human rights 
protection, while, on the other hand, the Court rejects oversight of its own human 
rights standards by a specialised human rights court, the European Court of Human 
Rights. The construal of the Court of Justice’s approach to external judicial review – in 
one case of its own legal order, in another of the international – requires to carefully 
balance multiple considerations. As such, the Court’s judgments in Opinion 2/13 and 
Kadi offer significant insights into the character of the institution. What they reveal is a 
court caught between competing legal principles in an international environment of 
contested legal authority. This paper contrasts the case law of the Court of Justice 
on the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms with the Kadi saga in order to tease out new details about 
the three-fold relationship between fundamental rights, international law and the 
autonomy of EU law. More precisely, it enquires to what extent the Court’s approach 
to fundamental rights is consistent in the two cases. The paper argues that the CJEU 
has in its pursuit of autonomy created an inconsistency in its case law to the 
detriment of fundamental rights. 
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Introduction 
 
Opinion 2/13 on accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR) was one of the exceptional moments in the history of EU 
law, where the Full Court laid down an authoritative statement on a tripartite of 
interlinked legal issues with particular constitutional significance to the Court and the 
EU:1 the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, including its legal sources; the 
observance and development of international law; and the autonomy of the EU 
legal system, including the CJEU’s role within it. 
Almost six years prior to Opinion 2/13, however, the Court established a different 
landmark precedent that combined similar legal ingredients but generated a 
somewhat contrasting result. In Kadi, the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) motivated its excursion to the UN Security Council by pointing to the need to 
ensure that all EU acts comply with fundamental rights;2 if that objective requires the 
indirect review of a higher rule of law – a UN Security Council Resolution –, then so be 
it, seemed to be the underlying message of the Court at the time. 
The emphatic language and conclusion of Opinion 2/13 is an excellent opportunity 
to revisit Kadi and its no less interesting successor, Kadi II.3 In a bid to examine the 
CJEU’s credentials as a human rights or constitutional court, these two ‘sagas’ will 
represent two focus points around which the narrative of a court caught between 
legal principles will be examined. The analysis will be guided by a research problem 
arising from the juxtaposition of Opinion 2/13 and Kadi: to what extent is the CJEU’s 
approach to fundamental rights in the two cases consistent? More specifically, the 
research will investigate the divergence in the conduct of judicial review based on 
fundamental rights and how this paradox can be explained. Issues related to the 
core research problem, such as legal theory and the relationship of the Court to the 
ECHR and international law, will be addressed as well where relevant. The paper 
argues that the CJEU has in its pursuit of autonomy – its ‘place in the sun’ – created 
an inconsistency in the case law that has an adverse effect on fundamental rights 
and international law. 
                                                 
1 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 
2014 (Opinion 2/13), 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
2 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission, 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461.  
3 Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
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Opinion 2/13 
 
Few judgments of the CJEU have sparked such negative outpouring from the expert 
community, as has Opinion 2/13. 4  The few defenders of the Court put forward 
‘modest’ cases in support of the Opinion and even those were made with 
reservations.5 The Advocate General had advised the Court to give a conditional 
‘yes’ to the draft accession agreement and the Court gave a resounding ‘no’.6 
The decision is complex, with various intricacies identified by the Court in assessing 
the compatibility of the draft accession agreement with EU law. One way of 
attaining a global view of the Opinion is to look at the intention to accede to the 
ECHR enshrined in the Treaties by the legislators. It is difficult to dispute that the 
phrase “the Union shall accede” in Article 6(2) TEU represents an obligation on the 
part of the EU to make accession happen. At the same time, the subsequent 
sentence of the Article (emphasised in Protocol No. 8) makes clear that an eventual 
accession “shall not affect the Union’s competences”. As a result, although the latter 
is not framed explicitly as a condition of the obligation to accede, the Treaty-makers 
have placed certain limits on the terms of accession. These limits, however, also serve 
as obstacles to accession, thus creating a tension with the obligation to accede. It 
fell to the Court to determine the balance between the two and the critics could 
argue that the Court has focused all its attention on the constraints (why accession is 
not possible), while it has somewhat forgotten about the obligation.7 
The View of the Advocate General 
The picture that the CJEU arrived at after reviewing the draft agreement against EU 
law will be considerably onerous to overcome both legally and politically. The Court 
has rejected the proposed agreement after taking issue with seven distinguishable 
                                                 
4  See for notable examples Peers, Steve, “The EU's Accession to the ECHR: The Dream 
Becomes a Nightmare”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, pp. 213-222; Douglas-Scott, 
Sionaidh, “Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: A Christmas Bombshell from the 
European Court of Justice”, Verfassungsblog, 24 December 2014; Odermatt, Jed, “Giant Step 
Backwards - Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European Convention on Human 
Rights”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 47, no. 4, 2014-15, 
pp. 783-797. 
5 See mainly Halberstam, Daniel, “’It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 
2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 
1, 2015, pp. 105-146. 
6 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 
2014 (Opinion 2/13), 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, View of AG Kokott of 13 June 2014. 
7  Indeed, the wording of the obligation is only mentioned by the Court when listing 
applicable legal provisions. 
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points in the draft text – the first three having been grouped under one heading in 
the Opinion – which have, according to the Court, in various ways precluded the 
compatibility of the draft agreement with EU law: 
1. Reconciling Article 53 of the Charter with Article 53 ECHR 
2. Issue of mutual trust and recognition 
3. Protocol No 16 to the ECHR and Article 267 TFEU 
4. Violation of Article 344 TFEU 
5. The co-respondent mechanism 
6. The prior involvement procedure 
7. Judicial review of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters 
The view of Advocate General Kokott provides the most comprehensive resource for 
the question what an alternative to the Court’s ruling could have looked like. On the 
whole, the advice of the Advocate General is to declare the draft agreement 
compatible with the Treaties provided that certain modifications are made.8 Of the 
seven issue areas highlighted by the Court, the Advocate General found only three 
problematic to the point where action by the negotiators was required: a potential 
violation of Article 344 TFEU on the jurisdictional monopoly of the EU Courts in EU 
matters (4.); the co-respondent mechanism (5.); and the prior involvement 
procedure (6.). First, as regards preserving the CJEU monopoly on dispute settlement 
under Article 344 TFEU, Advocate General Kokott suggested that existing measures at 
the disposal of the EU, such as infringement proceedings, should be sufficient to 
ensure the practical effectiveness of this provision; nevertheless, in case the Court 
wished to strengthen the safeguards, it could demand a declaration from the 
Member States not to submit disputes against each other to the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) pursuant to Article 33 ECHR where those would concern EU 
law.9 
Second, and more importantly, the Advocate General is on common ground with 
the Court that a number of issues plague the proposed co-respondent mechanism 
whereby the EU and the Member States could be deemed jointly responsible for 
violating the ECHR. According to the Advocate General, the draft agreement should 
be amended to reflect that: the EU and its Member States will be systematically 
informed about pending applications where becoming a co-respondent could be 
                                                 
8 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13, View of AG Kokott, op. cit., para 279. 
9 Ibid., paras 117-120. 
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of relevance to them; requests for leave for becoming a co-respondent are not 
subject to assessment by the ECtHR; no derogation from the principle of joint 
responsibility is possible; and, in line with Article 2 of Protocol No. 8 to the Treaties, that 
the draft agreement does not prejudice the reservations made to the ECHR by the 
Member States.10 
Finally, the Advocate General pointed out that the compatibility of the draft 
agreement with EU law requires that the prior involvement procedure can be 
bypassed only when it is clear that the CJEU has already addressed the issue of EU 
law raised in proceedings before the ECtHR.11 The proposal should also clarify that 
the prior involvement of the Court would encompass all legal issues, regardless of 
whether they concern primary or secondary EU law.12 
The sophisticated view of the Advocate General makes apparent that, while the 
Court might have strictly treated every potential complication as an insurmountable 
obstacle, the draft agreement has truly contained provisions that need attending to 
from the perspective of EU law. At the same time, Advocate General Kokott has also 
shown that the outcome of the Opinion might have turned on the willingness to 
constructively engage with the negotiators, which the Court has manifestly failed to 
do. This, however, brings up possibly the most important dimension of the ruling: 
normative and theoretical considerations are absolutely essential in a hard 
constitutional case like Opinion 2/13. What is more important than the stated 
technical objections of the Court to the draft agreement are the implicit assumptions 
about the nature of the international legal space and the Union’s place in it, and the 
normative choices regarding which considerations should principally guide the 
development of the EU legal order. 
Reception of the Opinion 
Understandably, the commentaries of the legal community have on the whole 
better reflected the importance of legal theory compared to the views of the 
Advocate General and the Court. This is a natural consequence of the CJEU’s 
institutional identity – sometimes referred to as ‘corporatist’ – which does not permit 
separate (dissenting or concurrent) opinions. As the Court pronounces its judgments 
‘with one voice’, the exposure of the role played by individual judges is suppressed in 
                                                 
10 Ibid., paras 196, 265, 280. 
11 Ibid., paras 184, 280. 
12 Ibid., para 135. 
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a bid to increase the authority of the decisions.13 However, by adopting a unitary line 
that is presented as the ‘right’ solution to a dispute, it is not possible for the Court to 
openly concede that its decisions are theoretically informed (and how), since that 
would lead to an erosion of the corporatist legal fiction; rather, the principles and 
beliefs that guide the Court’s decision-making can only be extrapolated from its 
case law by implication. 
Even among the scholars of EU law, discussions of underlying assumptions and theory 
are the exception to the rule of doctrinal analysis that does not fundamentally 
problematise the internal point of view of the legal system. Luckily, in the case of 
Opinion 2/13, a number of academics do explicitly engage with theoretical 
considerations, which makes it possible to create a picture that transcends the 
potentially inconclusive debates on technical points of the EU’s accession to the 
ECHR. The most theoretically informed study of Opinion 2/13 has been carried out by 
Daniel Halberstam, who has scrutinised the decision from the perspective of 
constitutional pluralism.14 Halberstam is among the minority of legal researchers that 
have attempted to take the Court’s reservations seriously and defend the Court’s 
judgment. In so doing, however, Halberstam explicitly adopts the lenses of 
constitutionalism and quasi-federalism in evaluating the Opinion. 
Constitutional pluralism implies the primacy of preserving the legal order’s own 
constitutional design over other considerations, irrespectively of whether these have 
a desirable normative character, as in the case of increased fundamental rights 
protection. In a broader sense, pluralist contestation among constitutional orders 
with overlapping jurisdictions is challenging for international law more generally, and 
it outright contradicts monist conceptions of the relationship between national (EU) 
and international law.15 
Following the constitutional premise, Halberstam’s analysis leads him to the 
conclusion that most of the Court’s grounds for rejecting accession are legitimate, 
                                                 
13 Iyiola, Solanke, “The Advocate General: Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to Secure Trust 
and Democracy”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 14, 2011-2012, p. 705; 
de Búrca, Gráinne, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a 
Human Rights Adjudicator?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 20, 
no. 2, 2013, p. 176. 
14 Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!”, op. cit. 
15 Somek, Alexander, “Monism: A Tale of the Undead”, in Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek (eds.), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012, pp. 
343-380. 
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even though the Court may have proposed some wrong remedies.16 To take the 
most controversial example from Halberstam’s account, he argues that a 
constitutional/federalist perspective can justify even the CJEU’s uneasiness about the 
ECtHR gaining jurisdiction in CFSP matters, where the Court’s own involvement is 
ruled out by the Treaty (with the exception of measures pursuant to Article 275 
TFEU).17 This assertion relies on the assumption that since after Lisbon there is only one 
EU legal order (formally no pillars anymore), the constitutional principles underlying 
EU law must in one way or another also apply to the CFSP, despite the explicit lack of 
CJEU jurisdiction (and EU legislative powers). 18  Contrary to the verdict of the 
Advocate General, Halberstam thus in effect dismisses the overt decision of the 
Treaty-makers which upheld the essentially intergovernmental nature of the CFSP.19 
Instead of acknowledging that the intergovernmentalism of the CFSP, too, is a 
specific feature of the EU which points to the imperfection of the 
constitutionalist/federalist narrative, Halberstam – and in a sense also the Court – puts 
forward an interpretation that conforms to his theory.20 
Although considerably more could be said about the constitutionalist angle, the 
preceding paragraphs should capture the crux of the argument. On the opposite 
end of the spectrum voices that accuse the CJEU of engaging in ‘radical pluralism’, 
which impedes a basic judicial dialogue with the ECtHR, can be found and also the 
majority who are concerned by the manifest disconnect between the “defensive 
and territorial attitude” of the CJEU and the purported – but seemingly forgotten – 
                                                 
16 Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!”, op. cit., p. 115. However, see the diverging view 
of Spaventa, Eleanor, “A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union after Opinion 2/13”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
vol. 22, no. 1, 2015, pp. 35-56. 
17 Article 24 TEU; Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!”, op. cit., p. 138; “The EU’s Accession 
to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!”, Editorial Comments, Common Market Law Review, vol. 
52, no. 1, 2015, p. 12; Krenn, Christoph, “Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: 
A Path to ECHR Accession After Opinion 2/13”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, p. 
160. 
18 Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!”, op. cit., p. 138. 
19 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13, View of AG Kokott, op. cit., para 101. 
20 de Witte, Bruno & Šejla Imamovič, “Opinion 2/13 on the Accession to the ECHR: Defending 
the EU Legal Order against a Foreign Human Rights Court”, European Law Review, vol. 40, no. 
5, 2015, p. 703. Compare with Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13, op. cit., 
para 257. 
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objective of the whole exercise to bring the EU into the ECHR regime: improving 
fundamental rights protection in Europe.21 
From the standpoint of fundamental rights, the list of sticks to beat the CJEU with is 
considerable, but a number of central objections stand out. First, it has not escaped 
the attention of the human rights lawyers that the Court practically avoided 
discussing the aforementioned obligation to accede to the ECHR pursuant to Article 
6(2) TEU.22 The balance of the decision is thus significantly tilted towards enumerating 
reasons why accession is not possible, as opposed to finding ways of fulfilling the 
Treaty obligation. 
A similar disequilibrium can be found in the Court’s choice of legal principles. As most 
observers agree, the central theme of Opinion 2/13 is autonomy. But why not rule of 
law or, rather obviously, fundamental rights?23 Plainly, a “community based on the 
rule of law” – codified as one of the values in Article 2 TEU – should have an interest in 
judicial review by a specialised human rights court which forms an established 
feature of the Member States’ legal systems.24 When it comes to the protection of 
fundamental rights, the Treaties make unambiguously clear that this is an area of 
strong EU concern, in addition to the Court’s own relationship with fundamental rights 
and particularly the ECHR.25 
The issue of overlooked principles becomes even more palpable in some specific 
examples, such as the explicit requirement of “respect for fundamental rights” in the 
area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) in Article 67(1) TFEU. According to Steve 
Peers, the Treaties therefore do not prioritise mutual trust among Member States over 
fundamental rights, but rather the opposite holds true.26 The Court was, nevertheless, 
exclusively concerned by the potential effect of the accession on mutual trust, 
                                                 
21 See, for example, de Witte & Imamovič, op. cit., pp. 683-705; Eeckhout, Piet, “Opinion 2/13 
on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy or Autarky?”, Fordham 
International Law Journal, vol. 38, no. 4, 2015, pp. 955-992; Peers, op. cit., pp. 213-222; 
Douglas-Scott, op. cit. 
22 “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!”, Editorial Comments, op. cit., p. 13. 
23 Peers, op. cit., p. 221. 
24 Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v European Parliament, 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166, 
para 23. 
25 Peers, op. cit., p. 221. 
26 Ibid. 
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despite the fact that the AFSJ is at the forefront of the “enormous lacuna” in EU 
fundamental rights protection.27 
To come back to the example of the CFSP, a rights-minded approach points to at 
least two arguments against the Court’s Opinion: first, the Treaty-makers have 
consciously decided in the Treaty of Lisbon to both restrict the CJEU’s jurisdiction in 
CFSP matters (Article 24(1) TEU) and impose an obligation on the EU to accede to 
the ECHR (Article 6(2) TEU). The Court, however, completely disregarded the possible 
connection between the two provisions that would indicate that the Herren der 
Verträge have foreseen CFSP matters being eventually reviewed by the ECtHR, thus 
filling another part of the EU human rights lacuna.28 Second, an a contrario reading 
of Article 344 TFEU, which states that Member States may not submit a dispute to 
“any method of settlement other than those provided for [in the Treaties]”, would 
imply that where the Treaties expressly deny jurisdiction of the CJEU, the Member 
States may submit the dispute to a different court.29 In fact, the position of the Court 
in Opinion 2/13 that the EU cannot submit itself through an international agreement 
to the jurisdiction of an international court where the CJEU itself lacks powers is a 
particularly troubling one from the perspective of international law, and it more than 
symbolically marks another low in the ‘tormented relationship’ between Union and 
international law.30 
Looking more generally at the CJEU’s objection with regard to the possible violation 
of Article 344 TFEU, the Court appears to have interpreted this article so strictly as to 
endanger the mixed agreements signed by the EU in the past.31 The reason is that 
the Court established that the mere possibility that the Member States could submit a 
dispute to the ECtHR, pursuant to Article 33 ECHR, is sufficient to “undermine the 
requirement set out in Article 344 TFEU”. 32 However, not only has the Advocate 
General found that such an interpretation runs contrary to a number of existing 
                                                 
27 Gragl, Paul, “A Giant Leap for European Human Rights? The Final Agreement on the 
European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 51, no. 1, 2014, p. 45. 
28 “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!”, Editorial Comments, op. cit., p. 13. 
29 Peers, op. cit., p. 221; Johansen, Stian Øby, “The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in 
Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential Consequences”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, p. 
176. 
30 Wouters, Jan, “The Tormented Relationship between International Law and EU Law”, in 
Pieter Dekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law Work in the 
Global Economy: Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2010, pp. 198-221. 
31 Johansen, op. cit., p. 176. 
32 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13, op. cit., para 208. 
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agreements, it has also been argued that the CJEU has challenged its previous case 
law under which an international agreement was compatible with Article 344 TFEU, 
as long as it afforded the Member States the opportunity to act in accordance with 
the Treaties.33 It is difficult to see in light of these issues – and the omitted obligation to 
accede of Article 6(2) TEU – what would justify imposing a stricter standard, other 
than the Court’s determination to preserve its autonomy by rejecting accession to 
the ECHR. 
What should have become clear from the preceding paragraphs is that Opinion 
2/13 could have been a very different judgment had the Court chosen a less 
formalistic approach.34 Of the seven concerns raised by the Court (listed above), 
only the two procedural points (5. and 6.) have received more than a modicum of 
sympathy from most legal commentators, including the Advocate General. The rest 
of the judgment has been subjected to a scathing critique of a rarely seen 
magnitude. 
A good part of why the CJEU was criticised so strongly is that the constitutional 
nature of the case gave the Court a wide interpretative margin. The Court has 
adopted a defensive attitude which emphasised the autonomy of EU law and the 
CJEU’s prerogatives in that regard, but from the perspective of fundamental rights 
protection this has been far from obvious or inevitable. Having said that, Opinion 
2/13 does seem to lend support to Daniel Halberstam’s theoretical argument that the 
constitutional element – at least in so far as it is perceived by the interpreting 
international court – is essential in a legal pluralist constellation. Unfortunately, the 
intensity and breadth of criticism show that the theoretical premise can yield 
normatively sub-optimal results which resemble legal autarky more than legal 
pluralism.35 Indeed, to the extent that fundamental rights should be at the core of 
the EU’s constitutional identity, it is difficult to see how Opinion 2/13 caters to the 
integrity of the constitutional order by demoting fundamental rights protection in the 
EU. 
                                                 
33 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion 2/13, View of AG Kokott, op. cit., para 117; 
Johansen, op. cit., p. 172; Eeckhout, op. cit., pp. 978-981. 
34 “The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!”, Editorial Comments, op. cit., p. 1. 
35 Eeckhout, op. cit., p. 992. 
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Autonomy and the ECHR in Recent Case Law 
Autonomy has been given a crucial role by the CJEU in Opinion 2/13, but were there 
prior indications that the Court was becoming increasingly stingy about its 
prerogatives and the position of the EU legal order vis-à-vis other legal systems?36 
Daniel Halberstam reasons that the Court has on numerous important occasions 
signalled its position, albeit in a less theatrical fashion compared to Opinion 2/13.37 
The CJEU already put a break on accession in Opinion 2/94 by requiring a Treaty 
amendment.38 More recently, the Court has been eager to stress the autonomy of 
EU law not only vis-à-vis Member State law – a recurrent source of concern – but also 
with respect to international law. While in Opinion 1/09 the Court ‘merely’ found the 
setting up of the European Patent Court incompatible with the Treaties, the 
accentuation of autonomy has taken the most dramatic form in the Kadi judgment, 
where the CJEU indirectly challenged the primacy of a UN Security Council 
Resolution by reviewing EU implementing regulations.39 
Although such constitutional decisions test the attitude of the CJEU at critical 
junctures, a more systematic analysis of the Court’s case law is necessary to establish 
the existence of a trend in favour of a more autonomous court. As regards the ECHR, 
the frequency with which the CJEU refers to it provides a measure of the level of 
autonomy the Court wishes to exercise towards the foremost human rights regime in 
Europe. Laurent Scheeck has argued that the relationship between the two Courts 
cannot be only competitive or only cooperative but will carry aspects of both.40 In 
the form of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Court appears to have in any 
case obtained a licence to become more self-reliant or isolated from the ECHR.41 
Empirical studies of references to the ECHR in the CJEU’s case law confirm the 
evolving nature of the relationship. From 1974 until 1998, the ECHR has been 
                                                 
36 Ziegler, Katja, “Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – Or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU Law, Human 
Rights and International Law”, in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott & Nicholas Hatzis (eds.), Research 
Handbook on EU Human Rights Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016, forthcoming. 
37 Halberstam, “It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!”, op. cit., p. 109. 
38 Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court of 28 March 1996, Accession 
by the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Opinion 2/94), 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. 
39 Ibid.; de Búrca, Gráinne, “The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor”, 
American Journal of International Law, vol. 105, no. 4, 2011, pp. 649-93. How Kadi relates to 
Opinion 2/13 is covered in detail in the next section. 
40 Scheeck, Laurent, “Competition, Conflict and Cooperation between European Courts and 
the Diplomacy of Supranational Judicial Networks”, GARNET Working Paper, no. 23/07, August 
2007, p. 4. 
41 de Búrca, “After the EU Charter”, op. cit., pp. 175-176. 
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mentioned by the Court a little more than 70 times.42 As the references kept growing, 
that number was surpassed in only eight subsequent years; between 1998 and 2005, 
the CJEU referred to the ECHR 7,5 times more often than to all other human rights 
instruments combined, confirming the ‘special significance’ of the ECHR for EU law.43 
However, the picture changed after 2009 when the EU Charter became legally 
binding. Between 2009 and 2012, the CJEU cited the ECHR only 18 times in the 122 
judgments (less than 15%) that referred to the Charter. The Charter has thus 
unmistakably become the instrument of choice for the Court, in a number of cases 
demonstrably at the expense of the ECHR.44 
Building on de Búrca’s analysis, the present paper surveyed 173 judgments, orders 
and opinions of the CJEU tagged as concerning fundamental rights in the systematic 
classification scheme reveals that from 2013 until the end of 2015, the Court has 
referred to the Charter 163 times and to the ECHR (and/or the ECtHR) on 74 
occasions. Disregarding two cases in which the Court cited the Convention without 
referring to the Charter, the ECHR has been mentioned in 44% of the cases that also 
mention the Charter, which represents a marked increase compared to the four-
year period analysed by de Búrca.45 Having said that, the Charter is used much more 
by the Court, and in the vast majority of cases where both instruments are 
mentioned references to the Charter far outnumber those to the ECHR, which is 
often cited by the parties but then not picked up by the CJEU. This is related to a 
methodological caveat, namely that the comparability of the data with previous 
research is partly in question due to the lack of clarity regarding how references 
were counted in de Búrca’s work.46 
Before jumping to conclusions – and bearing in mind the methodological caveats – it 
should be noted that the increase in the number of references to the ECHR can be a 
natural consequence of the growing fundamental rights litigation before the CJEU. 
As the Charter is used more than previously and new rights are invoked before the 
                                                 
42  Guild, Elspeth & Guillaume Lesieur, The European Court of Justice on the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Who Said What, When?, London, Kluwer Law International, 
1998. 
43 Scheeck, op. cit., p. 12. 
44 Arnaiz, Alejandro & Aida Torres Pérez, “Main Trends in the Recent Case Law of the EU Court 
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in the Field of Fundamental Rights”, 
European Parliament Study, PE462.446, Brussels, 2012, p. 98. 
45 The two outstanding cases are C-171/14 P, Calvi v European Court of Human Rights, 2014, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2281, and C-216/14, Covaci, 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:686. 
46  The approach taken here was to search every judgment classified as concerning 
fundamental rights for separate references to the Charter and the Convention and count 
any mention by any party or the Court as a reference for the purpose of the research. 
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Court, the experience of the Convention regime is perhaps required more than 
before. 
Nonetheless, it is undeniable that the data seem to somewhat disrupt a linear 
narrative of a reinforced autonomy of EU law and the CJEU’s jurisdiction. The 
numbers show that the binding nature of the Charter may not have been the 
terminal blow to the role of the Convention in EU law that could have been 
anticipated shortly after 2009. Contrasting the recent data with the vigour of 
autonomy in Opinion 2/13, it could be argued that rather than a blanket rejection of 
external legal regimes (‘autarky’), the CJEU is interested in being in charge of when, 
where (AFSJ?) and how (judicial review by the ECtHR?) these other regimes can 
enter the Union legal order (‘autonomy’). For as long as the latter competence of 
the CJEU is not threatened – as was the case in Opinion 2/13 – the Court might find 
most of the time referencing the ECHR and the Strasbourg case law (as follows from 
Article 52(3) of the Charter) unproblematic, even though it will still prioritise the 
Charter in order to develop it and thus augment its independence from external 
sources of fundamental rights. 
The fact that the Court wishes to engage with international law, including the ECHR, 
on its own terms and selectively should not surprise.47 In a recent preliminary ruling, 
however, the CJEU has taken a sharper stance on the obligation of a conforming 
interpretation of the Charter with the ECHR (Article 52(3) of the Charter). For the first 
time it referred to a passage on autonomy in the legally significant explanations to 
the Charter: 
[T]he explanations relating to Article 52 of the Charter indicate that 
paragraph 3 of that article is intended to ensure the necessary 
consistency between the Charter and the ECHR, ‘without thereby 
adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and ... that of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union’.48 
                                                 
47 See for example Wouters, Jan, Jed Odermatt & Thomas Ramopoulos, “Worlds Apart? 
Comparing the Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to 
International Law”, in Marise Cremona & Anne Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice 
and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 249-
279. 
48 Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84, para 47. 
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The Court’s reference to this part of the explanations is slightly peculiar, given that 
the explanations actually address the legislator, something omitted by the Court in its 
citation.49 The spirit of Opinion 2/13 lingers over this judgment. 
The Court’s engagement with the ECHR demonstrates a markedly pluralist approach 
to fundamental rights protection. Opinion 2/13 highlighted that constitutional 
considerations push the Court to the edge of the pluralist scale, but also that the 
Court struggles to reconcile the purported centrality of fundamental rights protection 
in the EU legal order with its actual improvement. In a moment of truth, the CJEU 
chose to interpret accession to the Convention in light of fears about the erosion of 
its competences instead of boosting fundamental rights. The refusal to intricate itself 
into the web of international legal regimes is familiar from a previous judicial saga 
which, however, showed an almost unrecognisable concern for fundamental rights, 
even to the point where external judicial review was deemed acceptable, 
contrastingly to Opinion 2/13. 
 
  
                                                 
49 European Union, “Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C303, 14 December 2007, p. 33. 
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Kadi and External Judicial Review 
 
The other line of case law that has profoundly shaken the European – and indeed 
international – legal community is the CJEU’s judgment in Kadi and to a lesser extent 
the follow-up in Kadi II. 50  Lauded by some as an ambitious fundamental rights 
endeavour of the Court that transcends the confines of the European polity, it is 
difficult to resist having a fresh look at the Kadi saga in light of the Court’s Opinion 
2/13, as it appears that the Court itself has not followed what it preached in Kadi.51 
The Kadi Saga 
Kadi belongs to the rare class of judgments of the Court that has invited a seemingly 
endless amount of attention. Rightly so, as the decision has been one of the most 
important constitutional statements of the Court since the inception of the Union 
legal order and which has given rise to legal controversies far outside the EU. It is 
beyond the scope of this paper to review all of the criticisms; therefore, the focus is 
on issues connected to external judicial review on the basis of fundamental rights. 
Advancing in a chronological order, the CJEU’s reasoning in support of its divisive 
encroachment on international law in Kadi I is analysed first before turning the 
attention to the appeal decision in Kadi II which supplies further detail as to the 
Court’s view of the triangle of fundamental rights, international law and autonomy. 
Kadi I 
The Kadi saga began when Mr Yassin Abdullah Kadi was blacklisted by the UN 
Security Council in 2001 for being suspected to have financed international terrorism, 
as a result of which his financial assets have been frozen. The EU has quickly 
implemented the UN Security Council Resolution through an amending Commission 
Regulation.52 The first judgment in the saga was handed down by the General Court 
                                                 
50 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission, 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461; Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 
2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
51 Kokott, Juliane & Christoph Sobotta, “The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and 
International Law – Finding the Balance?”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 23, no. 
4, 2012, pp. 1015-1024; Ziegler, Katja, “Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting 
International Law: The Kadi Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights”, 
Human Rights Law Review, vol. 9, no. 2, 2009, pp. 288-305. 
52 European Commission, “Commission Regulation (EC) No 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 
amending, for the third time, Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of 
certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the 
freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan and 
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in 2005, which established that Security Council resolutions cannot be reviewed 
against EU law, invoking the peremptory norms of jus cogens in the process.53 
On appeal, the CJEU reached a vastly different conclusion with the autonomy of 
Union law and of the EU judicature assuming a central role: 
It follows [...] that the obligations imposed by an international 
agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the constitutional 
principles of the EC Treaty, which include the principle that all 
Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect 
constituting a condition of their lawfulness which it is for the Court to 
review in the framework of the complete system of legal remedies 
established by the Treaty.54 
The CJEU has therefore not only overturned the General Court’s decision, but also 
completely changed the underlying interpretation; the internationalist deference to 
the supremacy of UN Security Council resolutions (or ‘a strictly monist view’) was 
superseded by a challenge to public international law emanating from an 
autonomous, almost hermetically sealed, regional regime (a dualist or pluralist 
approach).55 In an echo of the rule of law principle established in Les Verts, the Court 
has reiterated that no EU acts can escape fundamental rights review (“in principle 
full review”) by the Union judicature, regardless of whether these merely implement 
Security Council measures.56 The fact that in the process the Court referred to the UN 
Charter – the constitutional document of modern public international law – as “an 
international agreement” underlined the haughty tone of the judgment in the eyes 
of international lawyers.57 
To make judicial review in Kadi possible in the first place, seemingly without disposing 
of the supremacy of international law, the CJEU’s reasoning dissociated the EU 
implementing regulation from its source, the UN Security Council Resolution. 58 
According to the Court, this judicial move would “not entail any challenge to the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 337/2000”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 277, 20 
October 2001, pp. 25-26. 
53 Case T-315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission, 2005, ECLI:EU:T:2005:332, para 225. 
54 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., para 285. 
55 Wouters, “Tormented Relationship”, op. cit., p. 212; de Búrca, Gráinne, “The European Court 
of Justice and the International Legal Order After Kadi”, Harvard International Law Journal, 
vol. 51, no. 1, 2010, p. 2. 
56 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., para 326. 
57 Wouters, “Tormented Relationship”, op. cit., p. 216. 
58 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., para 286. 
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primacy of that resolution in international law”. 59  The feeling that the Court’s 
commitment to the latter was merely rhetorical is difficult to shake off.  
Antonios Tzanakopoulos elaborates on the separation of the EU act from 
international law by underlining the formalism of the Court’s reasoning: of course the 
CJEU does not challenge the primacy of the Security Council measure senso strictu, 
given that the Court does not have the legal competence to produce binding 
interpretations of such measures (not even the International Court of Justice does).60 
Beyond the formalism, however, is the CJEU’s curious assertion that the UN Charter 
does not in essence exclude “review of internal lawfulness” of an implementing 
measure.61 Tzanakopoulos calls this a case of accommodation rather than dualism, 
since the Court identifies the freedom to conduct the judicial review in international 
law itself.62 Nevertheless, he finds this reasoning unconvincing, as the CJEU disregards 
the distinction between international obligations that allow for some discretion and 
those that do not. The obligation under Security Council Resolution 1267 at stake in 
the case was of the second kind, thereby leaving no meaningful margin of discretion 
for the EU institutions to exercise and for the CJEU to review.63 
The reactions to the appeal judgment were mixed and reflected the tensions among 
the various principles at play in the decision itself, reminding of the debate from the 
previous section on the importance of principles in constitutional cases. Katja Ziegler 
pointed to the positive contribution made by the Court to human rights and the 
international rule of law, while at the same time admitting that the judgment further 
worsens the fragmentation of international law.64 Others have highlighted that with 
the Solange doctrine in place, the CJEU had no other option but to review the 
dubious UN sanctions system with respect to fundamental rights, as failing to do so 
would have undermined the presumption on which the autonomy of the EU legal 
                                                 
59 Ibid., para 288. 
60 Tzanakopoulos, Antonios, “The Solange Argument as a Justification for Disobeying the 
Security Council in the Kadi Judgments”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe 
Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, 
Routledge, 2014, p. 122. 
61 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., para 299. 
62 Tzanakopoulos, op. cit., p. 123. 
63 Ibid., p. 124. 
64 Ziegler, “Strengthening the Rule of Law”, op. cit., pp. 288-305. 
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order from the Member State rests.65 Others still have welcomed that the Court was 
careful to preserve the autonomy of EU law in the face of an external challenge.66 
Perhaps more importantly, some scholars identified that Kadi presented an 
opportunity to strike a better balance between EU law autonomy, deference to 
international law and the protection of fundamental rights than the one established 
by either of the EU courts in their judgments. Daniel Halberstam and Eric Stein opined 
in the wake of the appeal judgment that until the UN creates safeguard procedures 
that would guarantee an acceptable level of human rights protection – essentially 
one that would permit municipal courts to adopt a Solange (II) type of presumption – 
national and regional courts should be able to indirectly review Security Council 
resolutions not only against jus cogens norms, but also customary international 
human rights law.67 
Kadi II 
In Kadi II, the General Court appeared to be at pains to overcome its distaste 
towards the appeal judgment of the CJEU in Kadi I. There, the Court of Justice held 
that although the considerable measure of freezing funds cannot be in principle 
regarded as disproportionate in light of the general object of maintaining 
international peace and security, in the particular circumstances of the case, the 
measures were unjustified due to the lack of effective judicial protection for Mr 
Kadi.68 The same has been repeated reluctantly, if almost verbatim, by the General 
Court in Kadi II, leading the former Court of First Instance to agree with Mr Kadi that 
the principle of proportionality had been breached.69 
While in the appeal the CJEU upheld the operative conclusion of the General Court, 
it disagreed with some of the underlying reasoning. The Court found it necessary to 
examine in detail the summary made known by the Sanctions Committee in an effort 
to balance the rights of the applicant on the one hand, and the effectuation of 
                                                 
65 Kokott & Sobota, op. cit., p. 1019. 
66  Kunoy, Bjorn & Anthony Dawes, “Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The Ménage a Trois 
Between EC Law, International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights 
Following the UN Sanctions Cases”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 73-
104. 
67 Halberstam, Daniel & Eric Stein, “The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of 
Sweden: Economic Sanctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order”, Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, p. 71. Taking an international law perspective of Kadi, Jan 
Wouters concurs with this approach; see Wouters, “Tormented Relationship”, op. cit., p. 218. 
68 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., paras 363, 351, 369. 
69 Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission, 2010, ECLI:EU:T:2010:418, para194. 
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Security Council sanctions (implemented through EU regulations) on the other. 70 
Contrary to the General Court, the CJEU stated that where the competent European 
authority is not in the possession of the evidence in question, this does not 
automatically lead to an infringement of fundamental rights, even though the 
authority in question is still obliged to seek cooperation with the UN.71 Instead, in such 
a situation, the CJEU established that the EU courts shall examine the “indications in 
the narrative summary of reasons”.72 
Equally, where evidence cannot be made readily disclosed to the EU courts and the 
defence, a careful balance must be struck between legitimate security concerns 
and the rights of the defence.73 Depending on the assessment of the legitimacy of 
the non-disclosure, the competent court must ascertain the effects on the rights of 
the defence. At any rate, the CJEU has held that only one substantiated and 
legitimate reason for instituting the preventive measure is sufficient for the CJEU to 
uphold the measure as a whole; if none are found satisfactory, the measure will be 
struck down, as was duly the case with Mr Kadi also the second time around.74 
The standard of review is relatively exacting. 75  Both matters of procedure and 
substance are covered and the Court goes into quite some detail in its assessment, 
showing the breadth and depth of what a ‘full review’ in light of fundamental rights 
shall entail.76 The CJEU considered the extent of the review “all the more essential” 
due to the perceived failure of the UN system to introduce sufficient human rights 
safeguards, despite certain improvements following the first Kadi judgment.77  
After the Court originally criticised the lack of effective judicial protection – calling 
the sanctions procedures essentially “diplomatic and intergovernmental” – the UN 
has introduced an ex officio periodic re-examination of the sanctions list and the 
                                                 
70 Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, op. cit., para 130. 
71 Ibid., paras 139, 114. 
72 Ibid., para 123. 
73 Ibid., paras 126, 131. 
74 Ibid., para 130. 
75 Fontanelli, Filippo, “Kadieu: Connecting the Dots – from Resolution 1267 to Judgment C-
584/10 P: The Coming of Age of Judicial Review”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & 
Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, 
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76 Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, op. cit., para 40. 
77 Ibid., para 133. 
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Office of the Ombudsperson.78 When the issue arose again in Kadi II, the Court was, 
however, not convinced of the effectiveness of the new safeguards – similarly, albeit 
in a different way, to the ECtHR – while at the same time leaving the door open for a 
possible future application of conditional deference of the Solange type.79 
Ultimately, the Court rejected the quasi-judicial format of review developed at the 
UN Security Council and instead required that a “declaration from a court” be 
available to persons affected by a contested measure. 80 If the CJEU’s insistence on 
this requirement continues, it is questionable whether establishing the 
abovementioned Solange II presumption could ever become a reality. Barring an 
extremely unlikely transformation of the International Court of Justice’s rules of 
jurisdiction, it would be a no less challenging task for the Security Council to reform its 
sanctions procedures in a way that would comply with the CJEU’s ruling in Kadi II. In 
fact, the reaction of the Security Council was to make sanctions less targeted and as 
a consequence more difficult to be brought before a court – arguably a net loss for 
fundamental rights in practice.81 
 
The Double Standard(s) of Kadi and Opinion 2/13 
 
It is perhaps easy to lose sight due to the copious legal issues of a basic point about 
the Kadi saga, which is that the CJEU carried out judicial review – with some detail in 
Kadi II – based on fundamental rights of acts emanating from a different legal order. 
Moreover, the Court has set a high standard for the review (‘full review’), which 
included examining the procedures and underlying reasoning employed by not just 
any international organisation, but the UN Security Council. While the CJEU set the 
standard of ‘full review’ already in Kadi I, the full proportionality test balancing 
fundamental rights against security concerns has really been applied in Kadi II.82 Kadi 
II is thus more than just a confirmation of Kadi I – it fleshes out in practice the 
requirements of judicial review as applied by the Court with respect to international 
norms and, crucially, the Court shows that reconciling competing interests 
(principles) in the international legal order is done according to an “EU-preferred 
                                                 
78 Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat, 2008, op. cit., para 323. 
79 Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, op. cit., para 133; de Wet, Erika, 
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81 Tzanakopoulos, op. cit., p. 134. 
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balance”, which happens to be, at least in Kadi, also heavily influenced by the 
ECHR.83 
The conduct of judicial review in Kadi could hardly be more puzzling in light of the 
hindsight afforded by the analysis of Opinion 2/13. One of the basic aspects to take 
away from the Opinion is the Court’s rejection of an external judicial review based 
on fundamental rights. Yet, the Court does precisely that in relation to the UN 
Security Council in the Kadi cases, with its balancing approach even likened to the 
ECtHR’s way of working. 84  The discrepancy between Opinion 2/13 and Kadi is 
compounded by the existence of the Bosphorus presumption85 – noticeably not 
implemented in the Kadi saga – in the relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR 
which lowers the standard of review, and would not necessarily go away with the 
EU’s accession.86 What could explain the apparent double standard(s) – hypocrisy, 
some may even say – and what could possibly justify it, if anything? 
As a preliminary matter, the meaning of ‘external’ needs elucidation. By external 
review, it is understood here that the judicial body carrying out the review, which 
may also be indirect, does not, in a conventional sense, form part of the same legal 
system as the bodies responsible for the act or omission under examination. This 
definition of external judicial review is somewhat clumsy in order to address at least 
three pitfalls: first, as the CJEU so skilfully demonstrated in Kadi I, it is possible to create 
the illusion of non-review by simply stating so and then reviewing a measure 
intended to give effect to the original act, even when the implementation of the act 
was non-discretionary and under a strict obligation. Second, for the judicial review to 
be ‘external’, the court executing it should stand apart from the legal system that 
produced the case. Prima facie, it is obvious that the CJEU is not part of the UN-
instituted international judicature or that the ECtHR is not an EU court. However, from 
an international perspective, municipal courts are expected to consider and enforce 
international law in the exercise of their competences. Contrary to this decentralised 
                                                 
83 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
84 Sarvarian, op. cit., p. 102. 
85 In the Bosphorus case, the ECtHR established a presumption of ‘comparable’ protection of 
rights enshrined in the ECHR by the EU in spite of it not being a party to the Convention. 
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Lukasz Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner (eds.), Deference in International Courts and Tribunals: 
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understanding of judicial effectuation of international law, the phrase ‘in a 
conventional sense’ serves to indicate that some minimal delimitations of different 
legal orders exist that make a designation of judicial review as ‘external’ possible. 
Finally, the definition takes a broad view of judicial review in order to accommodate 
the fundamental rights approach of the ECtHR and the CJEU in Kadi. 
For the explanation of the double standard, it is necessary to recall the role of 
autonomy in both cases. In Kadi, preserving the autonomy of EU law and the Court’s 
ability to review acts thereof had a two-fold consequence: the Court boosted the 
importance of fundamental rights in the EU and triggered some institutional changes 
to that end also in the Security Council, but this occurred notably at the expense of 
the authority and effectiveness of international law. Opinion 2/13 emphasised 
autonomy to an even greater extent – as the perceived ‘danger’ to the legal order 
was higher – but in contrast to Kadi, the result is not increased fundamental rights 
protection anywhere. Nevertheless, both judgments show that the outward effect of 
the autonomous legal order doctrine is that the CJEU is not overly preoccupied by 
the ‘strict observance’ of international law, never mind its development in the sense 
of Article 3(5) TEU. 
Similar to the approach of the CJEU to the ECHR, its relationship to international law 
more generally had been marked by ups and downs.87 Throughout the development 
of EU law, the nexus with international law has represented the other strand of 
demarcation of the boundaries of Union law as an autonomous system of law, next 
to the CJEU’s ‘turf war’ against the Member States. The double standard in external 
judicial review is one of the most recent manifestations of the Court’s insistence on 
outward autonomy, arguably reaching new heights. While international law is not 
necessarily the ‘target’ of the Court, it appears to be caught in the ‘cross-fire’ of its 
claims to autonomy which entrench fragmentation and pluralism in the international 
legal landscape. The CJEU is sometimes willing to display an open mind towards 
international law, as cases such as Racke exhibit,88 but the incoherence of external 
judicial review points towards a constitutional tendency at the Court that triggers a 
territorial attitude when push comes to shove. 
Despite the fundamental rights parlance of the Court in Kadi, it is clear from Opinion 
2/13 that the truly central element in the constitutional mosaic of EU law is autonomy. 
                                                 
87 See for example Wouters, “Tormented Relationship”, op. cit., pp. 198-221. 
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Granted, the CJEU likes to repeat that fundamental rights form ‘an integral part’ of 
EU law but if that is the case, a high degree of autonomy of the Union legal order 
appears even more integral. In Kadi, the objective of strengthening autonomy 
coincided with greater emphasis on fundamental rights protection, not the other 
way around, and it has been even suggested that already Kadi II served the interests 
of the Court more than the individual, despite the use of fundamental rights. 89 
Opinion 2/13 brought out the real motivation, as preserving a high-degree of 
autonomy no longer aligned with increased fundamental rights protection. It should 
not be so surprising: human rights have been consciously omitted from the core of 
the Community at its beginning, only to be eventually brought in by the Court as a 
practical necessity stemming from the cohabitation with Member States’ judicial 
ordinances.90 Nor has the CJEU been a model participant in a system of ‘multi-level 
judicial protection’, having been accused of a ‘selfish attitude’, whereby its 
unwillingness to cooperate with other international dispute settlement systems has 
hindered individual access to justice.91 
 
Conclusion 
 
It would be a mistake to dismiss the double standards of external judicial review as 
being of relevance merely to legal scholars. Even if not immediately quantifiable, the 
CJEU’s two-facedness chips away from the credibility and legitimacy of the EU’s 
ability to act or simply ‘be’ on the international scene.92 The resolution of seemingly 
internal judicial disputes by the CJEU affects the character of the EU, which has 
external implications. 
This paper sought to investigate to what extent the Court’s approach to 
fundamental rights is consistent in Kadi and Opinion 2/13. The analysis revealed that 
the result of the Court’s decision-making is highly complex: the preservation of 
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autonomy triggers a robustly pluralist approach to the international legal order that 
side-lines international law, deepens the divide between internal and external EU 
fundamental rights policy and ultimately erodes the image of the EU as a ‘virtuous 
international actor’ wishing to credibly exude normative power as a result of 
undercutting EU external coherence. 93  On a more practical level, the Court’s 
rejection of accession to the ECHR has added uncertainty to the EU’s rules transfers 
to third countries which take place mainly as part of pre-accession conditionality or 
the European Neighbourhood Policy. What happens when the rules transferred – 
often filled with normative content – are subject to divergent interpretations of the 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts is unclear. 
The issues put in front of the Court of Justice in Opinion 2/13 and Kadi were by no 
means straightforward. Balancing so many considerations – fundamental rights, 
relationship to international law, autonomy of EU law and others – in individual 
judgments is almost always bound to disappoint some observers. There are no 
perfect solutions in such hard constitutional cases as the ones analysed in this study. 
Nevertheless, it has been demonstrated that the Court’s interpretation and 
balancing of legal principles in the cases – more visibly in Opinion 2/13 but also in 
Kadi – has tended disproportionately more towards the autonomy of the EU legal 
order at the expense of fundamental rights and international law. Following this 
narrative, the limited strengthening of international human rights protection in Kadi 
has been a positive externality of the CJEU’s preoccupation with autonomy, not the 
reverse. When the tables turned in Opinion 2/13, the Court’s true colours shone 
through. 
When it comes to international law, it has featured even more conspicuously lower 
down the Court’s priorities. Despite the ECHR’s specific place in both EU and 
international human rights law, the Court’s decision in Opinion 2/13 has done little to 
allay the fears of gradual disengagement from the international order evoked by 
Kadi. Although a quantitative analysis of the Court’s case law has shown few signs of 
a further decline in references to the ECHR, the polarising jargon of autonomy has 
seeped into the most recent case law of the Court. The question of what the broader 
legacy of Opinion 2/13 will be requires more time to answer but that should not divert 
attention from its most obvious and pressing consequence: the EU remaining outside 
of the ECHR regime. Should the resuscitation of the EU’s accession not be successful, 
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the one-word epitaph summarising the whole endeavour would probably be 
‘autonomy’. 
While concerns about autonomy of EU law are in principle legitimate, the foregoing 
analyses of Kadi and Opinion 2/13 show that the Court construes them 
disproportionately in cases that define its attitude to fundamental rights and external 
judicial review. The juxtaposition of the two lines of case law reveals the existence of 
a double standard, whereby, in essence, the level of fundamental rights protection 
varies as a by-product of the prevailing considerations regarding the autonomy of EU 
law and of the CJEU. This is the message of hypocrisy that transcends the 
incoherence towards external judicial review as ‘developed’ by the Court – Opinion 
2/13 has shattered the narrative from the Kadi saga of a virtuous Court intervening 
into the international system for the sake of individuals without access to justice.94 On 
the contrary, it has laid bare the supremacy of autonomy and unmasked a two-
faced Court more concerned by its metaphorical ‘place in the sun’ than 
strengthening the fundamental rights protection under its own auspices. 
 
                                                 
94 Martinico, Giuseppe, “The Autonomy of EU Law: A Joint Celebration of Kadi II and Van 
Gend en Loos”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A 
Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, Routledge, 2014, p. 162. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2016 
28 
Bibliography 
Books and articles 
“The EU’s Accession to the ECHR – a ‘NO’ from the ECJ!”, Editorial Comments, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 52, no. 1, 2015, pp. 1-16. 
Arnaiz, Alejandro & Aida Torres Pérez, “Main Trends in the Recent Case Law of the EU Court of 
Justice and the European Court of Human Rights in the Field of Fundamental Rights”, 
European Parliament Study, PE462.446, Brussels, 2012.  
Bílková, Veronika, “The Standard of Equivalent Protection as a Standard of Review”, in Lukasz 
Gruszczynski & Wouter Werner (eds.), Deference in International Courts and Tribunals: 
Standard of Review and Margin of Appreciation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014, pp. 
272-288. 
Bretherton, Charlotte & John Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, London, 
Routledge, 2006, 2nd edn. 
de Búrca, Gráinne, “After the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights: The Court of Justice as a 
Human Rights Adjudicator?”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, vol. 20, 
no. 2, 2013, pp. 168-184. 
de Búrca, Gráinne, “The European Court of Justice and the International Legal Order After 
Kadi”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 51, no. 1, 2010, pp. 1-50. 
de Búrca, Gráinne, “The Road Not Taken: The EU as a Global Human Rights Actor”, American 
Journal of International Law, vol. 105, no. 4, 2011, pp. 649-93. 
de Wet, Erika, “From Kadi to Nada: Judicial Techniques Favouring Human Rights over United 
Nations Security Council Sanctions”, Chinese Journal of International Law, vol. 12, no. 4, 2013, 
pp. 787-808. 
de Witte, Bruno & Šejla Imamovič, “Opinion 2/13 on the accession to the ECHR: defending 
the EU legal order against a foreign human rights court”, European Law Review, vol. 40, no. 5, 
2015, pp. 683-705. 
de Witte, Bruno, “A Selfish Court? The Court of Justice and the Design of International Dispute 
Settlement beyond the European Union”, in Marise Cremona & Anne Thies (eds.), The 
European Court of Justice and External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2014, pp. 33-46. 
Douglas-Scott, Sionaidh, “Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR: A Christmas Bombshell 
from the European Court of Justice”, Verfassungsblog, 24 December 2014, retrieved 2 April 
2016, http://verfassungsblog.de/opinion-213-eu-accession-echr-christmas-bombshell-
european-court-justice-2. 
Eeckhout, Piet, “Opinion 2/13 on EU Accession to the ECHR and Judicial Dialogue: Autonomy 
or Autarky?”, Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 38, no. 4, 2015, pp. 955-992. 
Fontanelli, Filippo, “Kadieu: Connecting the Dots – from Resolution 1267 to Judgment C-
584/10 P: The Coming of Age of Judicial Review”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & 
Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, 
London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 7-21. 
Gragl, Paul, “A Giant Leap for European Human Rights? The Final Agreement on the 
European Union’s Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights”, Common 
Market Law Review, vol. 51, no. 1, 2014, pp. 13-58. 
Guild, Elspeth & Guillaume Lesieur, The European Court of Justice on the European 
Convention on Human Rights: Who Said What, When?, London, Kluwer Law International, 
1998. 
Michal Ovádek 
29 
Halberstam, Daniel & Eric Stein, “The United Nations, the European Union, and the King of 
Sweden: Economic Snctions and Individual Rights in a Plural World Order”, Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 13-72. 
Halberstam, Daniel, “’It’s the Autonomy, Stupid!’ A Modest Defense of Opinion 2/13 on EU 
Accession to the ECHR, and the Way Forward”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, pp. 
105-146. 
Iyiola Solanke, “The Advocate General: Assisting the CJEU of Article 13 TEU to Secure Trust and 
Democracy”, Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies, vol. 14, 2011-2012, pp. 697-
721. 
Jacqué, Jean-Paul, “Non à l’adhésion à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme 
?”, Droit de l’Union européenne, 23 December 2014, retrieved 25 April 2016, http://www.droit-
union-europeenne.be/412337458. 
Johansen, Stian Øby, “The Reinterpretation of TFEU Article 344 in Opinion 2/13 and Its Potential 
Consequences”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, pp. 170-178. 
Kokott, Juliane & Christoph Sobotta, “The Kadi Case – Constitutional Core Values and 
International Law – Finding the Balance?”, European Journal of International Law, vol. 23, no. 
4, 2012, pp. 1015-1024. 
Krenn, Christoph, “Autonomy and Effectiveness as Common Concerns: A Path to ECHR 
Accession After Opinion 2/13”, German Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, pp. 148-168. 
Kunoy, Bjorn & Anthony Dawes, “Plate Tectonics in Luxembourg: The Ménage a Trois Between 
EC Law, International Law and the European Convention on Human Rights Following the UN 
Sanctions Cases”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 46, no. 1, 2009, pp. 73-104. 
Martinico, Giuseppe, “The Autonomy of EU Law: A Joint Celebration of Kadi II and Van Gend 
en Loos”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A 
Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 157-171. 
Odermatt, Jed, “Giant Step Backwards - Opinion 2/13 on the EU's Accession to the European 
Convention on Human Rights”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, 
vol. 47, no. 4, 2014-15, pp. 783-797. 
Peers, Steve, “The EU's Accession to the ECHR: The Dream Becomes a Nightmare”, German 
Law Journal, vol. 16, no. 1, 2015, pp. 213-222. 
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich, “Multilevel Judicial Protection of ‘Access to Justice’ and the EU’s 
Duty to Contribute ‘to the Strict Observance and Development of International Law’”, in 
Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted 
Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 187-217. 
Sarvarian, Arman, “The Kadi II Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union: 
Implications for Judicial Review of UN Security Council Resolutions”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo 
Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi 
Judgment, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 95-107. 
Scheeck, Laurent, “Competition, Conflict and Cooperation between European Courts and 
the Diplomacy of Supranational Judicial Networks”, GARNET Working Paper, no. 23/07, August 
2007. 
Somek, Alexander, “Monism: A Tale of the Undead”, in Matej Avbelj & Jan Komárek (eds.), 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2012, pp. 
343-380. 
Spaventa, Eleanor, “A Very Fearful Court? The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the 
European Union after Opinion 2/13”, Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law, 
vol. 22, no. 1, 2015, pp. 35-56. 
Stewart, Emma, “Mind the Normative Gap? The EU in the South Caucasus”, in Richard 
Whitman (ed.), Normative Power Europe: Empirical and Theoretical Perspectives, Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 65-82. 
EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2016 
30 
Tzanakopoulos, Antonios, “The Solange Argument as a Justification for Disobeying the 
Security Council in the Kadi Judgments”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe 
Martinico (eds.), Kadi on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, 
Routledge, 2014, pp. 121-134. 
Wouters, Jan, “The Tormented Relationship between International Law and EU Law”, in Pieter 
Dekker, Rudolf Dolzer & Michael Waibel (eds.), Making Transnational Law Work in the Global 
Economy: Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 
198-221. 
Wouters, Jan, Jed Odermatt & Thomas Ramopoulos, “Worlds Apart? Comparing the 
Approaches of the European Court of Justice and the EU Legislature to International Law”, in 
Marise Cremona & Anne Thies (eds.), The European Court of Justice and External Relations 
Law: Constitutional Challenges, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2014, pp. 249-279. 
Yang, Nele, “Constitutional Dimensions of Administrative Cooperation: Potentials for 
Reorientation in Kadi II”, in Matej Avbelj, Filippo Fontanelli & Giuseppe Martinico (eds.), Kadi 
on Trial: A Multifaceted Analysis of the Kadi Judgment, London, Routledge, 2014, pp. 172-186. 
Ziegler, Katja, “Autonomy: From Myth to Reality – Or Hubris on a Tightrope? EU Law, Human 
Rights and International Law”, in Sionaidh Douglas-Scott & Nicholas Hatzis (eds.), Research 
Handbook on EU Human Rights Law, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2016, forthcoming. 
Ziegler, Katja, “Strengthening the Rule of Law, but Fragmenting International Law: The Kadi 
Decision of the ECJ from the Perspective of Human Rights”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 9, 
no. 2, 2009, pp. 288-305. 
 
Legislation and case law 
Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste Les Verts v European Parliament, 1986, ECLI:EU:C:1986:166. 
Case C-162/96, Racke, 1999, ECLI:EU:C:1998:293. 
Case C-171/14 P, Calvi v European Court of Human Rights, 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2281. 
Case C-216/14, Covaci, 2015, ECLI:EU:C:2015:686. 
Case C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v Council 
and Commission, 2008, ECLI:EU:C:2008:461. 
Case C-46/87 and C-227/88, Hoechst, 1989, ECLI:EU:C:1989:337. 
Case C-584/10 P, Commission and Others v Kadi, 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:518. 
Case C-601/15 PPU, J.N., 2016, ECLI:EU:C:2016:84. 
Case T-315/01, Kadi v Council and Commission, 2005, ECLI:EU:T:2005:332. 
Case T-85/09, Kadi v Commission, 2010, ECLI:EU:T:2010:418. 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 
(Opinion 2/13), 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2454. 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court (Full Court) of 18 December 2014 
(Opinion 2/13), 2014, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2475, View of AG Kokott of 13 June 2014. 
Court of Justice of the European Union, Opinion of the Court of 28 March 1996, Accession by 
the Community to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (Opinion 2/94), 1996, ECLI:EU:C:1996:140. 
European Commission, “Commission Regulation (EC) No 2062/2001 of 19 October 2001 
amending, for the third time, Council Regulation (EC) No 467/2001 prohibiting the export of 
certain goods and services to Afghanistan, strengthening the flight ban and extending the 
freeze of funds and other financial resources in respect of the Taliban of Afghanistan and 
repealing Regulation (EC) No 337/2000”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 277, 20 
October 2001, pp. 25-26. 
Michal Ovádek 
31 
European Union, “Explanations Relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights”, Official 
Journal of the European Union, C303, 14 December 2007, pp. 17-35. 
  
EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2016 
32 
 
List of recent EU Diplomacy Papers 
 
 
For the full list of papers and free download, please visit www.coleurope.eu/EDUP 
 
1/2014 
Georg Haßlinger, Climate Conundrums at High Altitude 
2/2014 
Dirk Buschle, Exporting the Internal Market – Panacea or Nemesis for the European 
Neighbourhood Policy? Lessons from the Energy Community  
3/2014 
Leander Leenders, EU Sanctions: A Relevant Foreign Policy Tool? 
4/2014 
Benjamin Thibaut Denis, Afghan Opium and the EU: Fighting the War Economy through 
Development Cooperation 
5/2014 
Nikolaj Borreschmidt, The EU’s Human Rights Promotion in China and Myanmar: Trading Rights 
for Might? 
6/2014 
Adam Kaznowski, Defying the Treaty: The Influence of the Polish and Lithuanian Council 
Presidencies on the Development of the Eastern Partnership 
7/2014 
Nicola Del Medico, A Black Knight in the Eastern Neighbourhood? Russia and EU Democracy 
Promotion in Armenia and Moldova 
8/2014 
Juliane Schmidt, Between Irrelevance and Integration? New Challenges to Diplomacy in the 
21st Century and the Role of the EEAS 
9/2014 
Eleanor Friel, Riding or Reaping the Whirlwind? An Account of the EU’s Engagement with 
Insecurity in Northern Nigeria 
 
1/2015 
Piotr Kobza, Civilian Power Europe in the Arctic: How Far Can the European Union Go North? 
2/2015 
Jonatan Thompson (ed.), The Atlantic – A Bridge Too Far? TTIP’s Provenance, Prospects and 
Pitfalls 
3/2015 
Mayya Romanova, The European Union against a BRICS Wall? The Case of the Syrian Crisis 
4/2015 
Tim Gemers, Brussels and Reykjavík: Drifting Further Apart? Explaining the Icelandic Public 
Opposition towards EU Membership 
5/2015 
Rannvá Clementsen, Tim Gemers, Raphaël Lemahieu, Andrea Saviolo and Mark Sheetz, 
Prospects for Security on the European Continent 
6/2015 
Emilia Jeppsson, A Differentiated, Balanced and Patient Approach to Conflict Resolution? 
The EU’s Involvement with Georgia’s Secessionist Conflicts beyond the August 2008 War 
7/2015 
Enrico Günther, The European Union’s Response to Piracy: Are the Lessons Learned in the 
Horn of Africa a Model for the Gulf of Guinea? 
Michal Ovádek 
33 
8/2015 
Bertram Lang, Taiwanese Lobbying in the European Union: ‘Workable Diplomacy’ and its 
Limitations  
 
1/2016 
Hugh O’Donnell, The European Union as a Mediator in Israel-Palestine: Operations Cast Lead 
and Protective Edge 
2/2016 
Michal Ovádek, External Judicial Review and Fundamental Rights in the EU: A Place in the 
Sun for the Court of Justice 
EU Diplomacy Paper 2/2016 
34 
College of Europe Studies 
Order online at www.peterlang.com 
 
 
 
vol. 18 Schunz, Simon, European Union Foreign Policy and the Global Climate Regime, 2014 (371 p.), 
ISBN 978-2-87574-134-9 pb. 
vol. 17 Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), Scrutinizing Internal and External Dimensions of European 
Law: Les dimensions internes et externes du droit européen à l’épreuve, Liber Amicorum Paul Demaret, 
Vol. I and II, 2013 (880 p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-085-4 pb. 
vol. 16 Chang, Michele / Monar, Jörg (eds.), The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon Era of Crises: 
Between Political Leadership and Policy Management (With a Foreword by Commission Vice President 
Maros Sefcovic), 2013 (298p.), ISBN 978-2-87574-028-1 pb. 
vol. 15 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, Unity and 
Effectiveness (with a Foreword by Herman Van Rompuy), 2012 (273 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-842-3 pb. 
vol. 14 Lannon, Erwan (ed.), The European Neighbourhood Policy’s Challenges / Les défis de la 
politique européenne de voisinage, 2012 (491 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-779-2 pb. 
vol. 13 Cremona, Marise / Monar, Jörg / Poli, Sara (eds.), The External Dimension of the European 
Union’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, 2011 (434 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-728-0 pb. 
vol. 12 Men, Jing / Balducci, Giuseppe (eds.), Prospects and Challenges for EU-China Relations in the 
21st Century: The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, 2010 (262 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-641-2 pb. 
vol. 11 Monar, Jörg (ed.), The Institutional Dimension of the European Union’s Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, 2010 (268 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-615-3 pb. 
vol. 10 Hanf, Dominik / Malacek, Klaus / Muir Elise (dir.), Langues et construction européenne, 2010 (286 
p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-594-1 br. 
vol. 9 Pelkmans, Jacques / Hanf, Dominik / Chang, Michele (eds.), The EU Internal Market in Compara-
tive Perspective: Economic, Political and Legal Analyses, 2008 (314 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-424-1 pb. 
vol. 8 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hans (eds.), Intellectual Property, Market Power and the Public Interest, 
2008 (315 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-422-7 pb. 
vol. 7 Inotai, András, The European Union and Southeastern Europe: Troubled Waters Ahead?, 2007 (414 
p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-071-7 pb. 
vol. 6 Govaere, Inge / Ullrich, Hanns (eds.), Intellectual Property, Public Policy, and International Trade, 
2007 (232 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-064-9 pb. 
vol. 5 Hanf, Dominik / Muñoz, Rodolphe (eds.), La libre circulation des personnes: États des lieux et 
perspectives, 2007 (329 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-061-8 pb. 
vol. 4 Mahncke, Dieter / Gstöhl, Sieglinde (eds.), Europe’s Near Abroad: Promises and Prospects of the 
EU’s Neighbourhood Policy, 2008 (318 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-047-2 pb. 
vol. 3 Mahncke, Dieter / Monar, Jörg (eds.), International Terrorism: A European Response to a Global 
Threat? 2006 (191p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-046-5 / U.S.-ISBN 978-0-8204-6691-0 pb. 
vol. 2 Demaret, Paul / Govaere, Inge / Hanf, Dominik (eds.), European Legal Dynamics - Dynamiques 
juridiques européennes, Revised and updated edition of 30 Years of European Legal Studies at the 
College of Europe, 2005 / 2007 (571 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-067-0 pb. 
vol. 1 Mahncke, Dieter / Ambos, Alicia / Reynolds, Christopher (eds.), European Foreign Policy: From 
Rhetoric to Reality?, 2004 (381 p.), ISBN 978-90-5201-247-6/ U.S.-ISBN 978-0-8204-6627-9 pb. 
